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Economies of scale and scope are often not exploited in Western agriculture. A general reason is 
probably that various types of transaction costs limit coordination among farmers. A more 
specific explanation is that coordination on land markets or machinery cooperation is difficult to 
achieve when farmers are heterogeneous as some kind of price differentiation is necessary for a 
Pareto-superior solution. This paper investigates experimentally such a coordination game with 
heterogeneous agents using an example inspired by agricultural land markets. The experimental 
findings suggest that a Pareto-optimal solution may not be found when agents are heterogeneous. 
The findings provide evidence for market failures and cooperation deficits as reasons for 
unexploited economies of scale in agriculture. Our findings are consistent with coordination 
failures that appear to be driven by behavioural factors such as anchoring-and-adjustment, 
inequity aversion, and a reverse form of winner’s curse.  
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
Western agriculture is characterized by small family farms and unexploited economies of scale 
and size. Moreover, these small farms do generally not - at least not to the extent as could be 
expected - establish and participate in different forms of horizontal cooperation that would allow 
them to benefit from the economics of size advantages of larger farms. The dominance and 
persistence of small family farms in this part of the world is likely to be a result of historical 
factors including present and past agricultural policies, and insufficient market mechanisms that 
do not support re-allocation to more efficient structures (Balmann 1995, Balmann et al. 2006). 
The establishment of more efficient structures may furthermore be mitigated by various 
transaction costs that limit vertical and horizontal coordination among farmers. Examples of such 
transaction costs include limited access to financial resources and opportunistic behaviour. A 
further potential explanation, which will be explored in this paper, is that there are specific 
difficulties to coordinate when actors are heterogeneous arising from behavioural factors. 
Previous studies have shown that situations which require price differentiation among 
heterogeneous agents may lead to a market failure (e.g. Balmann, 1995; Aurbacher et al. 1997). 
Although machinery cooperatives often would lead to an improved economic situation for all 
involved parties
1, Aurbacher et al. (2007) show that the establishment of such may be 
organizationally difficult when the farmers are heterogeneous and, e.g., have differing amounts of 
sunk costs invested in their present machinery. Another example related to coordination on land 
markets discussed by Balmann (1995) is that the establishment of large arable farms in order to 
exploit increasing returns may require price differentiation when the existing smaller farmers 
have heterogeneous reservation prices for their land (due to, e.g., differencing sunk costs and 
managerial skills).  
In order to better understand the under-exploitation of economies of scale in land markets as due 
to coordination failures, this study applies for the first time an experimental approach to analyze 
the problem of coordination and allocation in a situation with increasing returns and 
heterogeneous actors. If compared to an empirical examination, the experimental method offers 
                                                  
1 Studies from Sweden have shown that partnership arrangements among farmers can contribute to increased 
profitability and secured economic variability (e.g. Andersson et al., 2005), and that they have a positive impact on 
overall farm efficiency (Larsén, 2010).  the chance to exactly implement all of the model’s assumptions and therewith to directly compare 
individuals’ performance with the normative benchmark. In this study, we rely on the land market 
example discussed in Balmann (1995). However, similar coordination situations could be 
identified for horizontal cooperation among farmers, such as machinery-sharing arrangements. 
The example considers a situation of increasing returns of an entrepreneur who wants to establish 
a large arable farm in a region dominated by small arable farms. For reasons of simplicity, the 
existing small farms are assumed to consist of physically identical land plots for which the farms 
have heterogeneous opportunity costs (reservation prices). These heterogeneous opportunity costs 
may be resulting from different amounts of sunk costs. The profit-maximizing entrepreneur is 
assumed to have no own initial land and therefore wants to “take over” land from the small 
farmers by buying/renting. For the assumed setting, which will be explained in greater detail in 
the following section, a transaction between the entrepreneur and a sufficiently high number of 
existing farmers increases the total welfare. However, in order for transactions to take place and a 
welfare gain to be realized, the entrepreneur cannot compensate all farmers by the same amount. 
Thus, farmers with low reservation prices for their land cannot be compensated with the same 
amount as those with high reservation prices. Accordingly, the entrepreneur has to differentiate 
the land prices, which requires that the farmers reveal private information about their reservation 
prices. This coordination problem is analyzed experimentally using an auction game in which the 
participants of the experiment (small farmers) repeatedly make a bid/ an ask (request a price) to a 
computerized profit-maximizing entrepreneur who in each round determines which bids to accept 
or reject. The number of accepted bids is thus an indicator of the level of coordination. The 
outcome of the experiments is compared with a game theoretic prediction obtained using an 
agent-based model with genetic algorithms in which the agents “learn” their optimal bids. 
Besides trying to shed some light on the possibility of exploiting existing economies of scale by 
price differentiation, this study first implement and experimentally observes the effects of 
different rooms for negotiation and groups size in a complex coordination problem with 
heterogeneous players. In fact, this study also add to the knowledge on coordination games with 
large size groups, which is, with the exceptions of some market entry games (e.g. Rapoport et al., 
2000), weak-link games (e.g. VanHuyck et al. 1990), and public goods games (e.g. Isaac and 
Walker, 1989), still at an early stage. Our experimental results first show the severity of the 
coordination problem: either many bids are accepted or hardly any. Although are bids generally correlated with opportunity costs, some players seem to fall prey to a reverse winner’s curse 
(Thaler, 1988) by asking below their opportunity cost. Finally, and most probably the most severe 
obstacle to coordination, most players tend to ask for too much. We relate this behaviour to 
inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) with respect to prices 
with the low opportunity cost players and with respect to profits with the high opportunity cost 
players. Inequity aversion essentially points at the fact that individuals both think in term of 
absolute and relative payoffs (Bolton, 1991) and its occurrence has been experimentally 
corroborated also in settings with fixed asymmetric endowments of players (Goeree and Holt, 
2000) (which, because of the asymmetry of players, might be associated to our setting). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the following section, the example related 
to the land market and associated experimental setting will be described. Thereafter, a game-
theoretic equilibrium, our normative benchmark, will be derived and the experimental results 
presented. The paper ends with conclusions and outlook for further research.       
2. AN EXAMPLE RELATED TO THE LAND MARKET AND EXPERIMENTAL SETTING 
The analyzed setting, based on an example defined in Balmann (1995), considers a situation with 
increasing returns to scale of a profit-maximizing entrepreneur who wishes to establish a large 
arable farm in a certain region characterized by small farms by taking over (by buying or renting) 
the land of the existing farms. The existing small farms are for simplification assumed to endow 
equally large land plots. While all farmers’ land plots are assumed to have identical physical 
properties and thus being identical for the entrepreneur, the existing farmers have heterogeneous 
reservation prices (opportunity costs) for their land due to, e.g., differing sunk costs and/or 
managerial skills.
2 This is exemplified in Figure 1 by illustrating the average and marginal 
economic rent of the entrepreneur and average and marginal opportunity costs of the farmers. It is 
furthermore assumed that the total economic land rent of the entrepreneur, after a certain 
minimum number of land units, is higher than the aggregated opportunity costs of the farmers 
(for the example in Figure 1, this holds to the right of the point where the average economic land 
rent of the entrepreneur intersects with the average opportunity costs of the farmers). Thus, for 
the assumed setting, a welfare-improving situation is achieved if the entrepreneur is able to take 
over the land of a sufficient number of farmers. However, a realization of this means, for our 
                                                  
2 Geographical localization of the land plots are for simplification not considered in this example. setting, that the entrepreneur has to differentiate prices among the farmers as it is not possible for 
him/her to pay all farmers a price equal to the market price, Pm. A farmer is expected to only 
accept prices that satisfy his individual rationality constraints (i.e. the received price cannot not 
be lower than the reservation price), but is it organizationally possible to find a solution with 
differentiated prices? This was analyzed in an experimental setting where the subjects (students 




Figure 1: A land market example. Source: Authors. 
 
The potential maximum welfare gain, i.e. the welfare gain that is realized when a transaction 
takes place between the entrepreneur and all farmers/players, equals the entrepreneurs total value 
of production subtracted by the sum of the players’ reservation prices (area a×b in Figure 1). In 
order to analyze the impact of potential welfare gain and group size, four different treatments 
were used in the experiments (see Table 1): two different levels of potential welfare gain and two 
group sizes (7 and 14 participants respectively). The parameters where chosen so that the 
difference in the potential welfare gain is twice as high for treatments 2 and 4 compared to 
treatments 1 and 3 (704 and 352 units respectively). The assumed parameters, for the 
entrepreneurs production and the farmers/player, for all 4 treatments are displayed in Table 2 (it should be noted that these parameters where multiplied by 1000 in the experiment). With these 
treatment manipulations we expected that higher potential welfare gain and small groups of 
players make coordination easier and enlarge thus the number of transactions. Each experiment 
consisted of 40 repetitions. In each round, every participant was instructed to make an ask/a bid 
to the entrepreneur (i.e. to state an amount for which he/she was willing to sell his/her land for) 
while having information about its own reservation price for land, the distribution of the other 
participants’ reservation prices and the total and average value of the production of the 
entrepreneur. In every round, each player received a new reservation price which was randomly 
drawn from the same distribution. This feature has been preferred toward assigning each player a 
fix reservation price throughout the game, in order to focus, for this first step of analysis, on the 
groups’ capability to coordinate and rather control for learning effects in the form of adjustment. 
After every round, each participant received feedback on the total number of accepted asks, 
whether his/her own ask was accepted or not and the own pay-off.  In case the bid was accepted 
by the entrepreneur, the participant received this amount. In case of a rejection of the bid by the 
entrepreneur, the player received his/her reservation price. In order to avoid strategic behaviour, 
reputation building, and envy, participants received no feedback on the others’ asks and payoffs. 
The participants in the game received real incentives in the form of monetary compensation that 
were proportional to their performance in the game.    
Table 1: Overview of the treatments. Source: Authors.  
   Group  size 
    “Small” (7 players)  “Large” (14 players) 
“Tight” (A-B = 352)  Treatment 1  Treatment 3  Potential welfare gain 
“Generous” (A-B =704)  Treatment 2  Treatment 4 




    Treatment 1 – “tight room for negotiations”  Treatment 2 – “generous room for negotiations” 















value of prod. 
Average value 
of prod.* 
Player 1: 80  1  12  12  12.0  14  14  14.0 
Player 2: 160  2  52  40  26.0  74  60  37.0 
Player 3: 240  3  232  180  77.3  314  240  104.7 
Player 4: 320  4  732  500  183.0  874  560  218.5 
Player 5: 400  5  1382  650  276.4  1634  760  326.8 
Player 6: 480  6  2022  640  337.0  2374  740  395.7 
Player 7: 560  7  2592  570  370.3  2944  570  420.6 
Reservation prices* - 
14 players 
  Treatment 3 - “tight room for negotiations”  Treatment 4 – “generous room for negotiations” 
Player 1: 40  1  6  6  6.0  7  7  7.0 
Player 2: 40  2  12  6  6.0  14  7  7.0 
Player 3: 80  3  32  20  10.7  44  30  14.7 
Player 4: 80  4  52  20  13.0  74  30  18.5 
Player 5: 120  5  142  90  28.4  194  120  38.8 
Player 6: 120  6  232  90  38.7  314  120  52.3 
Player 7: 160  7  482  250  68.9  594  280  84.9 
Player 8: 160  8  732  250  91.5  874  280  109.3 
Player 9: 200  9  1057  325  117.4  1254  380  139.3 
Player 10: 200  10  1382  325  138.2  1634  380  163.4 
Player 11: 240  11  1702  320  154.7  2004  370  182.2 
Player 12: 240  12  2022  320  168.5  2374  370  197.8 
Player 13: 280  13  2307  285  177.5  2659  285  204.5 
Player 14: 280  14  2592  285  185.1  2944  285  210.3 
† It should be noted that all parameters were multiplied with 1000 in the experiments. 
 
3. RESULTS  
3.1 A game theoretic equilibrium for optimal bidding behaviour   
What bidding behaviour is then to be expected from the participants in the experiments? In order 
to derive a game theoretic equilibrium for the bidding behaviour that can be used as a normative 
benchmark, an agent-based simulation with genetic algorithms learning was applied (cf. Marks 
2002, Balmann and Happe 2000). In the agent-based model, the entrepreneur and the small farmers are modelled as agents with the entrepreneur being, as in the experiments, a strictly profit 
maximizing computerized agent. The farm agents in the model “learn” their optimal bids for a 
given opportunity cost by applying an individual genetic algorithm and the entrepreneur and the 
small farms interact repeatedly on the market until the model converges towards an equilibrium.  
The steps of genetic algorithms are described in Appendix I, but can briefly be explained as 
follows. The first step is to define a genome (a set of test strategies or so-called genes) for each 
agent with a certain opportunity cost. The fitness of each of the different strategies is thereafter 
evaluated (where the fitness is in this case the profit or pay-off resulting from a certain bid). In 
the next step, the genetic algorithm operators – selection, crossover and mutation – are applied. 
The selection mechanism ensures that the best strategies survive and multiplied in the next 
generation (the new set of strategies/genes). The crossover and mutation operators create new 
strategies to be evaluated in the next generation. These steps are repeated until the model 
converges, i.e., the strategies are similar from one generation to the other and the strategies within 
the genome pool of the agent become homogeneous.            
For the assumed parameters, the game theoretic equilibrium obtained using the agent-based 
model with genetic algorithms learning implies that a transaction will take place between the 
entrepreneur and all players. The players extract all rent (the entrepreneur thus makes zero profit) 
which is distributed equally among them with the exception of the players with the highest 
opportunity costs who cannot receive more than the market price (the marginal demand of the 
entrepreneur).  
Formally, the game theoretic equilibrium implies that the predicted asks of player i equals 
min{oci + c; pmax} so that  ∑i aski = TW and c is maximized, where oci is the reservation price of 
player i, c is a constant (represented in the figure by the distance between the black and blue 
continuous lines for the first 6 players), pmax is the market price and TW is the total net potential 
welfare gain (i.e. 352 or 704). The equilibrium or predicted asks are illustrated for each of the 
treatments in Figures 3-5.  
3.2 Experimental results  
The experiments were carried out between September 2009 and April 2010 and the subject pool 
consisted of 112 participants/students of varying age and gender. A general observation from all 
experimental conditions is that exceptional asks occur quite frequently. For example, in each session some asks were lower than the respective opportunity cost of the player. The share of asks 
in each session that were lower than the respective opportunity cost varies between 0.4 – 14.6%. 
There were also some sessions with exceptionally high asks, for example more than ten times the 
opportunity cost. On the one hand, asking below opportunity cost is consistent with a reverse 
form of winner’s curse (Thaler, 1988). People wanting to ‘win’ the deal, i.e., make the 
transaction, appear to increase their chances of trading by selling below opportunity costs – hence 
losing money. On the other hand, outrageous asks mean taking a risky gamble (maybe somebody 
is willing to pay so much), however, without any possibility of actually losing money.  
3.2.1 Number of accepted asks 
The distribution of the number of accepted asks in each of the treatments is illustrated in Figure 2. 
As already stated above, the chosen parameter values imply that a positive welfare gain only can 
be achieved if the entrepreneur is able to take over the land of more than a certain minimum 
number of players. Thus, if players act rationally (i.e., do not ask for less than their opportunity 
cost) the number of accepted asks in a given round is expected to be either 0 or higher than this 
minimum number (close to the group’s size) corresponding to coordination failure and success, 
respectively. This coordination feature of our decision situation nicely shows up empirically in 
the bimodal distribution of accepted asks in Figure 2. Specifically, we get a distribution with very 
few, usually zero, accepted asks in some range between 1 and 5 (treatments 1 and 2) or 11-12 
(treatments 3 and 4). Due to a small share of non-rationally acting players (that made a bid lower 
than their opportunity cost), there are a few cases/rounds with one accepted ask (for example in 
treatment 1). 
From Table 3, we observe that the average number of accepted asks was, for all treatments, lower 
than predicted by the game-theoretic equilibrium (the benchmark case) and which is Pareto 
efficient (recall that, for the assumed parameters, the total welfare is maximized when the 
entrepreneur can take over the land of all players, which was also the game theoretic 
equilibrium). In fact, only 25-50% of the asks were accepted by the entrepreneur which has to be 
regarded as a highly inefficient outcome and a clear tendency towards coordination failure. It can 
be seen that, for a given group size, the average number of accepted asks is higher when the 
potential welfare gain is larger. It should also be mentioned that there was no improvement in the 
number of accepted asks over time (i.e. over the 40 rounds), although some cycles could be 
observed (e.g. several periods with 0 accepted asks followed by several periods of 6-7 accepted asks). In order to analyze learning effects (what was however not the purpose of our study), 
future experiments will be run assigning a fixed reservation price for each player throughout the 
game.   
A non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test was utilized to test for statistical significance of 
differences between the treatments with different potential welfare gains. This test is based on 
ranks with the null hypothesis that the two samples are drawn from identical populations. For the 
case of 14 players, the null hypothesis of no impact of welfare gain differences can be rejected at 
a 0.2%-level and for the case of 7 players it can be rejected at a 5.4%-level. Hence, higher 
potential welfare gains lead to a larger number of accepted asks.  
It is furthermore interesting to compare the average share of accepted asks between the sessions 
with different group sizes but the same potential welfare gains (i.e. treatment 1 with 3 and 2 with 
4). The average share of accepted asks was slightly higher for the smaller group in the case of 7 
players, but no statistically significant differences between the treatments were found.  
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of accepted asks by treatment. Source: Authors. 
 
 Table 3: Average number of accepted asks by treatment. Source: Authors. 
 Treatment 
 1 
7 players, tight room 
(N=160) 
2 
7 players, generous 
room (N=160) 
3 
14 players, tight room 
(N=80) 
4 
14 players, generous 
room (N=80) 




















Table 4: Average share of accepted asks by treatment. Source: Authors. 
 Treatment 
 1 
7 players, tight room 
(N=160) 
3 
14 players, tight room 
(N=80) 
2 




14 players, generous 
room (N=80) 
Average share of 
accepted asks 
0.35 0.26 0.52 0.51 





The fact that less than 50% asks are accepted in the treatments with “tight” room for negotiation 
and approximately 50% in the treatments with “generous” room for negotiation must be regarded 
as a highly inefficient outcome or coordination failure. Thus, the experiments do not support the 
hypothesis that auctions make players reveal private information about their opportunity costs. 
Smaller groups were on average slightly more efficient although this result is not statistically 
significant. This is not an especially surprising finding since fourteen players constitute a more 
complex coordination challenge than seven. Somehow related evidence on group size effects, 
proving that coordination is less efficient among large groups, comes e.g. from weak-link games 
(VanHuyck et al., 1990) as well as from public goods games (see the seminar work of Isaac and 
Walker, 1988). 
3.2.2 Level of asks and comparison with benchmark case 
We next turn to a comparison of the average levels of the asks with the predicted asks, i.e. the 
“optimal asks” that constitute the game theoretic equilibrium. The thick broken line in Figures 3-6 shows the average asks in the experiment whereas the thick unbroken line represents the 
predicted asks (the exact numbers are displayed in Table 7 in Appendix II). There is a positive 
and statistically significant correlation between the actual asks and the predicted asks, suggesting 
that the experiment participants considered their opportunity costs when making the bids. This is 
consistent with earlier experimental findings indicating that individuals ‘intuitively optimize’ 
(Levesque and Schade, 2005) by adjusting behaviour upwards and downwards in the correct 
direction (applying ‘anchoring and adjustment’; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) but at the same 
time fall prey to certain biases and hence do not exactly meet the optimum.  
It can furthermore be seen that, for low opportunity costs, the actual asks by the participants are 
on average higher than the predicted asks, suggesting that players with low opportunity costs on 
average ask for “too much”. In all treatments except treatment 1, also high opportunity costs 
players asked for an average price higher than predicted by the benchmark case. In order to test 
for statistically significant differences between the actual and predicted asks, the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test was applied separately for each opportunity cost level (the p-values are 
reported in Table 7).
3 This test suggests that there are in almost all cases significant differences 
between predicted and actual ask.
4  
The often “too high” top-ups of the low as well as the high opportunity cost players could be 
related to some form of inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), however, with an emphasis 
on different reference dimensions (what can be somehow related to the experimental results of 
Goeree and Holt, 2000). The high opportunity cost players appear to believe that they should 
receive the same top-up as the players with lower opportunity costs. At the same time, the low 
opportunity cost players may think that they should not be “punished” by receiving a lower price 
than the others. Specifically, whereas the relevant dimension of inequity aversion appears to be 
price with the low opportunity cost individuals, it rather appears to be mark-up with the high 
opportunity cost individuals. Most probably these are the dimensions that are considered ‘scarce’ 
or ‘prominent’ by the respective individuals.   
 
                                                  
3 As the asks are not normally distributed, a t-test could not be used. 
4 Significant differences between actual and predicted asks where found even in some cases where the average ask is 












































































































Figure 6: Comparison with benchmark, treatment 4. Source: Authors. 
 
3.2.3 Regression results 
The impact of the reservation price on the level of the players’ asks as well as on players’ net 
profits were analyzed separately for each treatment utilizing regression analysis. Net profit is here 
defined as the players’ payoff from the round of the game (i.e. the level of the ask in case of 
acceptance or the opportunity costs in case the ask was rejected) minus the opportunity cost. 
Since experimental data exhibit a panel structure (containing observations for each participant 
over 40 repetitions), unobserved heterogeneity could be controlled by employing panel data 
methods. The fixed effects estimators are reported in Tables 5 and 6.
5  
The results in Table 5 suggest that the positive correlation between the level of the ask and the 
reservation price, that could be observed in the above figures, is statistically significant and 
robust against unobserved factors. Thus, although players on average ask for too much compared 
to the benchmark case, they do consider their individual reservation prices when making their 
bids. This confirms the above consideration on ‘intuitive optimizing’ and anchoring-and-
adjustment. However, the coefficient of the opportunity costs is in all experiments smaller than 
one (in treatments 1 to 3 significantly lower than one at the 1%-level, while not significant in 
treatment 4). This supports the above finding that players with low opportunity costs in general 
ask for too much. 
                                                  
5 Random effects (RE) estimators were also obtained but a Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) suggested that there were 
statistically significant differences between estimators in some of the treatments indicating the RE estimators are 
inconsistent in those cases. Therefore, we report the consistent fixed effects estimators for all treatments. The results in Table 6 also suggest that there is a negative statistically significant correlation 
between ask and net profit. One possible explanation is related to the pricing mechanism 
according to which, in case of any accepted asks, the lowest asks are accepted first. A second 
explanation arises from the fact that low opportunity cost players ask for a higher mark-up than 
high opportunity cost players.  
In addition to the models presented in Tables 5 and 6 that only used reservation prices as 
explanatory variable, other model specifications have also been tested. For example, the inclusion 
of a time trend variable (indicating the number of periods) showed that the period number had no 
significant impact on the level of the ask or the profit. In order to see whether 
acceptance/rejection in the previous round has an effect on asks in the subsequent round, lagged 
acceptance dummies were included as explanatory variables. In this case, the signs of the 
coefficients as well as the significance levels varied among the treatments (as well as among 
sessions and individuals). In some cases, rejection in the previous round led to a higher ask in the 
current round. This is surprising at first sight since one would expect players to reduce their ask if 
they were not successful. The opposite behaviour may indicate that some participants played 
some type of tit for tat in the sense that they “punished” other players when their own ask was not 
accepted by playing in an even less cooperative way in the next round.  
 
Table 5: Fixed effects estimators – ask dependent variable. Source: Authors. 
Dependent variable: Ask 
  Treatment 1  Treatment 2  Treatment 3  Treatment 4 
Variable Coefficient  St.Error  Coefficient St.Error Coefficient St.Error Coefficient  St.Error 
Constant  159100*** 9170 166000***  14800 57100***  6330  86600***  19000 
Reservation 
price 
0.714*** 0.026 0.825*** 0.041 0.899*** 0.035  0.979***  0.107 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance on a 10, 5 and 1% level 
 Table 6: Fixed effects estimators – net profit dependent variable. Source: Authors. 
Dependent variable: Profit 
  Treatment 1  Treatment 2  Treatment 3  Treatment 4 
Variable Coefficient  St.Error  Coefficient St.Error Coefficient St.Error Coefficient  St.Error 
Constant  43800*** 4520 78700*** 4100  9910***  1280  61700***  2930 
Reservation 
price 
-0.115*** 0.013 -0.117*** 0.011 -0.030*** 0.007  -0.252***  0.016 
*. ** and *** indicates statistical significance on a 10, 5 and 1% level 
 
Looking at the experimental results from a different perspective, they support the view that it is 
typically not possible to achieve coordination among heterogeneous actors as this would require 
price discrimination. Nevertheless, the share of agreements seems to be affected by the potential 
welfare gains and the number of players.  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This study used an experimental approach to investigate a coordination game with heterogeneous 
agents. The experimental design reflects a situation often encountered in Western agriculture in 
which economies of size are rarely exploited, possibly partly due to problems of coordination 
when actors are heterogeneous. The specific example analyzed in this study focused on allocation 
of land plots, but similar coordination situations are relevant for, e.g., horizontal cooperation 
among farmers such as machinery sharing arrangements.  
The analyzed example considered an entrepreneur who wants to establish a large arable farm by 
buying or renting homogeneous land from a limited number of existing smaller farms with 
heterogeneous reservation prices. For the assumed setting, a Pareto-optimal solution is only 
feasible if the existing farmers accept heterogeneous prices and reveal their true individual 
opportunity costs. The experimental results suggest that it is typically not guaranteed that the 
entrepreneur finds an agreement with a sufficient number of sellers because of behavioural 
reasons, and that the degree of coordination indicated by the number of land plots sold is 
surprisingly low for all treatments (although somewhat higher for the treatments with larger space 
for negotiation). By comparing the experimental results with a game theoretic equilibrium 
obtained using an agent-based auction model in which the agents optimize their bidding by using a genetic algorithm (serving as normative benchmark prediction), it was found that players 
generally ask for a “too much”. The results suggest some form of equity aversion among the 
players where the low opportunity cost players focus on prices and appear to think they should 
not be “punished” by lower prices and the high opportunity cost players focus on profit and want 
similar top-ups as the low opportunity cost players.     
Assuming that the low allocative efficiency is not restricted to the auction type used in this 
example but also apply to the informal institutions often used in land markets, one of the reasons 
for the slow structural change in agriculture could be identified in the difficulty of solving a 
coordination problem with increasing economies of scale together with private and heterogeneous 
opportunity costs. The results of this study thus provide evidence for market failures and 
coordination deficits as reasons for unexploited economies of scale in agriculture. 
Although this study provide some first experimental evidence for coordination failures in the case 
of heterogeneous actors, the impact of other types of auction schemes and/or the possibilities for 
negotiation among the farm agents and among the farm agents and the entrepreneur should be 
explored. The type of auction used, as well as the experimental setting, should reflect real land 
market transactions as far as possible. A further planned extension of this work is to conduct the 
experiments with real farmers instead of students.
6 
In the case that also future studies, relying on more realistic settings as well as on different 
information- and feedback-protocols, support the findings of this study, a next step is to identify 
what market mechanisms are needed in order to support coordination in the case of 
heterogeneous agents so that reallocation to more efficient outcomes can be achieved.      
                                                  
6 This might be of particular interest also from the perspective of experimental economics, as some of the 
encountered behavioural effects, such as inequity aversion, have been shown to differently occur among different 
social and cultural groups (Kohler, 2008). REFERENCES 
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An agent-based simulation with genetic algorithms learning was applied in this study in order to 
derive a game theoretic equilibrium for the players bidding behaviour.  In this appendix, we will 
describe briefly the motivation for and general idea behind genetic algorithms (GAs), a 
computational intelligence method, originally introduced by Holland (1975), including an 
overview of the steps that most often are undertaken in a GA. After that, we will describe how we 
applied the GAs in our specific land market problem.  
Short introduction to genetic algorithms   
GAs have been used in a number of disciplines as tool for optimization, but also for determining 
equilibriums (such as game theoretic equilibriums in economic applications, e.g. Arifovic 1996). 
Although the GA is inspired by evolutionary biology – making use of evolutionary concepts such 
as selection, crossover and mutation -, the use of GAs have shown to be a promising method in 
many economic applications (cf. Balmann and Happe 2000) as these algorithms can be 
interpreted as models of learning behaviour of a population of adaptive agents. In economic 
applications, it is especially applicable in game theoretic contexts as it involves a population of 
competing strategies. An extensive description of GAs as a tool in economic models can be found 
in Dawid (1999).    
The main steps that most GAs follow are the following:   
Initialization: The first step involves defining a first generation of so-called genomes (a set of test 
strategies). This is usually done by using random values. In traditional GAs, the test strategies are 
coded into binary strings of 0 and1, but also other codings and even floating point numbers are 
possible. 
Fitness evaluation: The fitness of each of the genomes in the population is thereafter evaluated 
using the relevant fitness function (in economic applications, it may for example be profit or the 
pay-off).  
In the next steps, the genetic algorithm operators – selection, crossover and mutation – are 
applied:  
Selection: The selection operator ensures that the strategies with the highest fitness survive and 
are multiplied in the next generation (i.e., the new set of genomes/strategies). The selection function often has a stochastic element so that also some of the less fit strategies may survive in 
the next generation. There exist different methods for the selection, including the so-called 
roulette wheel selection and tournament selection.  The main objective of the selection is the 
reduction of the variety of solutions.  
Recombination: This operator is the main mechanism for creating new strategies to be tried out in 
the next generation (the next population of genomes/strategies). It combines strategies with high 
fitness in order to create even fitter strategies. This step is also often called crossover, particularly 
in the cases when the test strategies are represented as binary strings.  Also for this step, several 
different techniques have been used including the so-called one-point and two-point cross-over 
techniques.    
Mutation: After the crossover operator has been applied, the mutation operator is usually applied. 
This mechanism changes with a certain probability some part (bit) of the genome and increases 
also the variety of solutions.  
The steps above are repeated until the model converges, i.e., the strategies are similar from one 
generation to the other and the strategies within the string of genomes is relatively homogeneous.            
The GAs can either be applied to the whole population of agents, in which case each agent is 
represented by a single genome (cf Arifovic 1994), or it can be applied separately to the 
individual agents, in which case each agent owns a population of genomes (cf. Balmann and 
Happe 2000).   
The Genetic algorithm in the model 
As mentioned above, the GAs can either be applied by representing each agent with a single 
genome, or each individual agent is associated with a genome population. In our application it is 
necessary to follow the latter, multiple-population, approach as the agents are assumed to be 
heterogeneous (having differing opportunity costs) and heterogeneous strategies are required for 
the equilibrium. Each agent is in our model represented by 15 genomes/test strategies in each 
generation. Below we will describe how each of the steps of the GA was implemented, which 
thus was done for each of the individual agents simultaneously, in our model.   
Initialization: The initial values of the genomes were determined randomly.  Fitness: The fitness function, F, is in this application the pay-off for agent i’s genome n in testing 
round t. The agents pay-off equals the level of the ask subtracted by his/her opportunity cost in 
the case that the ask is accepted by the entrepreneur (and 0 otherwise), who, as described in 
section 2, is strictly profit maximizing and will only accept asks such that his total profit is 













          ( A 1 )  
n,k k n k n cost y  opportunit ask , , − = Π     if ask accepted the entrepreneur in test k 
         = 0         if ask not accepted by the entrepreneur in test k 
Where Rn is the number of testing rounds the genome n was tested with its current value. 
Selection: After evaluating and sorting the strategies of each genome population, we apply a 
selection mechanism that duplicates the three fittest strategies of each genome population and 
applies a stochastic element for the three genomes 4-6 (sorted according to descending fitness) in 
the sense that they are replaced with the fittest strategies with a probability of 0.2. The remaining 
6 genomes are replaced by genomes 4-9. Thus, the 6 genomes with the lowest fitness do not 
survive in the next generation of genomes.      
Recombination: Each genome is paired with another genome from the same population with a 
probability of 0.3. For a genome that is randomly chosen for recombination, the value, A, of new 
genome n to be passed on to the mutation step is determined as    
Ai,n,t = (A i,n,t × A i,m,t)
1/2           ( A 2 )  
where genome m is a randomly drawn genome in the same population.   
Mutation: The mutation operator is implemented in our model such that with a probability of 0.1, 
the genomes from the recombination step, are slightly modified according to      
Ai,n,t+1  = A i,n, t × 0.05(u –   0 . 5 )          (A3)  
where u is a random number drawn from a uniform distribution, i.e.  [] 1 , 0 ∈ u .     
The steps were repeated until the model converges. APPENDIX II: COMPARISON WITH BENCHMARK CASE 
 
Table 7: Experimental results and benchmark case. Source: Authors. 





























80 137  223  146  86  0.000  200.8  258  224  57  0.234 
160 217  261  121  44  0.006  280.8  297  109  16  0.606 
240 297  350  286  53  0.103  360.8  351  84  -10  0.000 
320 377  383  94  6  0.363  440.8  410  79  -31  0.000 
400 457  439  129  -18  0.001  520.8  485  65  -36  0.000 
480 537  498  142  -39  0.000  570  550  89  -20  0.000 
560 570  560  149  -10  0.000  570  659  522  89  0.000 
Spearman’s rho 
(p-value) 
0.761 (0.000)        0.802 (0.000)     





























40 68.5  106  119  37  0.000  100.4  153  118  53  0.000 
80 108.5  120  45  11  0.006  140.4  153  60  13  0.064 
120 148.5  165  93  17  0.040  180.4  209  134  28  0.029 
160 188.5  197  31  8  0.003  220.4  230  205  10  0.009 
200 228.5  245  112  16  0.259  260.4  253  174  -7  0.000 
240  268.5 261  25 -8  0.000  285  314 438  29  0.000 
280 285  313  169  28  0.000  285  391  535  106  0.000 
Spearman’s rho 
(p-value) 
0.881 (0.000)        0.661 (0.000)     
* Difference between predicted and average actual ask, ** Note that two players always received the same reservation 









 APPENDIX III: INSTRUCTIONS, CONTROL QUESTIONS AND SCREENSHOTS  
A III.1 Instructions 
The instructions below were used in the experiments for the treatments with 7 players (translated 
from German). 
Instructions 
Welcome to this experiment and thank you for your participation! 
Please read through the instructions carefully. If you have a question, please raise your hand. We 
will then come to you and answer your question. All participants in this experiment have received 
the same instructions as you. 
The experiment will take approximately 80-90 minutes. Please read these instructions carefully as 
your earnings in this experiment will depend on your decisions.  
Your will receive your total earnings in cash at the end of the experiment. 
Feel free to use a pencil, a sheet of paper and a pocket-calculator available on your desk. 
Please remain seated during the experiment. 
 
Your earnings 
The experiment consists of 40 rounds. In each game you have to collect as many “Taler” (our 
experimental currency) as possible as your earnings is proportional to the sum of the Talers which 
you gain during the game. 
You will receive 1 Euro cent (0.01 Euro) per 10.000 Taler.  All the other players will, just like 
you, receive 1 Euro cent for every 10.000 Taler during the experiment.   
 
Introduction 
Please imagine the following managerial situation.  Pretend that you, in each of the 40 games, operate an agricultural firm at your own land plot. 
Your firm/land plot is located in a region in which six additional agricultural firms operate. That 
is, there are, including yours, seven firms operating in the region.  
Every firm disposes a land plot which has the same size as yours. As all firms are located in the 
same region, the physical properties of each land plot are identical. However, since each of you 
produce different crops/use different technologies; there are differences between your current 
profits from the land use. That is, the land has a different economic value for you and the other 
firms.  
In every game the size of your profit will change. That is, the value of your land will change in 
every game (as if you in every game face different market conditions). The profit from your 
respective land use will be reported to you in the beginning of each new game.      
Imagine now that an entrepreneur in your region would like to form an agricultural firm and that 
he therefore is interested in buying land. He does initially not have any own land. He is planning 
to use one and the same technology on all acquired land plots.   
While yours and the other landowners profit from the land use differ (due to cultivation of 
different crops/different technologies), is the value of each land plot identical for the entrepreneur 
(i.e., the potential buyer).   
The new entrepreneur is only interested in acquiring a specific number of firms/land plots, as his 
average profit increases with the number of acquired firms as a result of higher efficiency in 
production. In other words, the more land plots the new entrepreneur can operate at the same 
time, the more cheaply he can produce the higher is his average profit. His willingness to pay for 
the land plots is determined by this calculation but is unrelated to the profit of the individual 
firms.   
 
Your decision 
In each of the following 40 rounds, you should decide at which price you could imagine to sell 
your land plot. All the other 6 land owners will do the same. All requests are then communicated 
to the entrepreneur.  The entrepreneur is in this game implemented as a computerized player and maximizes his profit! 
Given all price requests and his own profit possibilities, he will choose his profit maximizing 
purchase strategy. This means that he will first accept the lowest requests (if any), and thereafter 
the next highest requests. Lower requests therefore have higher probabilities to be accepted. 
Again, please note that the average profit of the new entrepreneur depends on the number of land 
plots that he can acquire.    
Every transaction, i.e. every land purchase, will occur at an individual price. The entrepreneur 
will either pay the requested price, or not buy at all. No negotiation will take place. As a profit 
maximizing strategy, the entrepreneur will accept requests up to the point where the most 
expensive sold land plot is cheaper than the increase of the profit through this purchase. This will 
have the following consequences for you: 
-  Your price request will be accepted when the bids of all more beneficial bidders already are 
accepted – or the most beneficial bidder – and with the purchase of your land plot related 
payment is lower than the profit gain, that the entrepreneur can achieve through the purchase 
of your land plot. 
-  Your request will otherwise not be accepted. You are thus not able to sell your land plot.   
Irrespectively of whether your land is sold or not, you can participate in the next game. You will 
then receive a new land plot! 
  
Your profit 
In every game, your profit depends on whether your price request is accepted or not.  
-  When your price requirement is accepted, is the profit corresponds to the amount that you 
have demanded for your land. 
-  When your demanded price is not accepted, you will receive the value of your land plot.   
 
Your information 
As basis for your decision you have the following information: -  Your profit of your land use. 
-  The distribution of the profit of all seven land owners. That is, you know exactly how 
high or low the profit of the other owners in the area is and how they are distributed.  
-  The profit of the new entrepreneur is dependent of the number of acquired land plots: the 
more land plots he acquires, the more economically he can operate. In a table with the 
following information you are presented the situation facing the computerized 
entrepreneur: 
o  Profit in relation to the number of acquired land plots. 
o  Average profit per land plot in relation to the number of acquired land plots. 
Please note that you, in the beginning of each game, will receive a new land plot and thereby new 
possibilities for making profits of the land use, independent on whether you have sold or not! The 
same hold for all other players. 
All other players will have the same information as you. 
 
Your feedback after each repetition 
After you and the other players have made your individual price requests, you will receive the 
following information:  
-  whether your request has been accepted or not 
-  how many purchases that have taken place, that is how many firm purchases respectively 
how many land units the entrepreneur has acquired. 
-  your payment in the last game played.  
All other players will after each game receive the same information as you. None of you will 
receive information about individual requests and individual payments of the other players.  
 
Before the game begins we ask you to answer a few control questions at the monitor. They will 
make sure that you have correctly understood the rules of the experiment. Good luck! A III.2 Control questions 
The following control questions were used in the experiment to ensure that the participants had 
understood the rules (translated from German). 
Control questions 
Before starting the game, please, answer the following questions. This is to make sure, that you 
have understood the rule of the game. 
Imagine, this is the game situation you have to play: 
 
Your profit and the profits of the others from your 
respective land plots: 
  Profit function of the entrepreneur: 
Land owner  Profits 
(in Taler) 
Land plots    Land plots 
acquired 




A (you)  160000  1    0  0  0 
B 80000 1    1  12000  12000 
C 240000 1    2  52000  26000 
D 560000 1    3  232000  77300 
E 400000      4  732000  183000 
F 480000 1    5 1382000  276400 
G 320000 1    6 2022000  370300 
      7  2592000  370300 
 
How much is your profit, in case you do not sell? […] 
Which land owner has the highest profits? […] 
Which land owner has the lowest profits? […] 
If 4 land plots get sold (i.e., if the entrepreneurs buy 4 plots), how much is the profit of the 
entrepreneur? […] 
Imagine, your made a ask of 165000 Taler and it is accepted. How much is your payoff in this 
case? […] 
 
  A III.3 Screenshots 
Below are two examples of the computer screens displayed to the experiment participants during 
the experiment. 
 





Example of screen showing the outcome of a round: 
 
  